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NOTES
THE FEDERAL INJUNCTION AND STATE COMMISSIONS:
THE RULE OF TE PRENTIS CASE
The exercise by the federal courts of the power to enjoin activities of state
regulatory commissions' has been subjected to much criticism,' since a great
part of the litigation involves highly controversial questions of interpretation

I

This power is based on the principle stated in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct.
441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (19o8): a state official exceeding the authority granted him by the state is
personally subject to suit in the federal courts; the action is not one against the state, within
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
2As a result Congress has passed an act providing for a special three-judge federal court
whenever an interlocutory injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement of any state statute,
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of state constitutions and statutes on which state courts are best qualified to
pass.3 It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Supreme Court has evolved
a number of limitations on this broad injunctive power. 4
One such self-imposed limitation, first enunciated in Prentisv. Atlantic Coast
Line Co.,s requires the federal courts to refrain from enjoining the enforcement of
orders of a state commission which are still subject to "legislative" revision by
another state agency. Although the revising body may be termed a court, and
may perform other functions of an undoubtedly judicial nature, it may be empowered by statute to revise commission orders upon the same general considerations-policy and expediency-that motivated the commission. Until such revision is completed an order is still in the "legislative" stage, and as a matter of
(?comity" it is thought best to require a litigant to exhaust his legislative remedies before appealing to the courts; he may eventually find it unnecessary to
6
seek an injunction.
or commission order under a state statute; see Judicial Code § 266, 36 Stat. 162 (IgII) 28
U.S.C.A. § 38o (1928); cf. the pending Johnson Bill, S. 752, which would deprive the federal
courts of all injunctive jurisdiction over state legislative or administrative action; i U.S. Law
Week 497 (1934); Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 795 (1934).
3 See Frankfurter and Landis, Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 33, 61-62 (1930); Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public
Utilities, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 379 (930); cf. Barnes, Federal Courts and State Regulation of Utility Rates, 43 Yale L. Jour. 417 (1934).
4 In Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed.
652 (1929), a complicated and important piece of utilities litigation was denied a federal adjudication, mainly because it presented primarily state issues and could be dealt with more
effectively in the state courts. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 3; Lilienthal, supra
note 3, 398-399. And recently, in Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 54 Sup. Ct. 138
(1933) , a decree of a federal district court that a state tax statute violated the state constitution was modified to permit further application to the court, "in case it shall appear that the
statute has been sustained [subsequently] by the state court as valid under the state constitution."
5 211 U.S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. i50 (19o8). Holmes, J., said, "It seems to us only
a just recognition of the solicitude with which [complainant's] rights have been guarded, that
they should make sure that the State in its final legislative action would not respect what they
think their rights to be, before resorting to the courts of the United States." (211 U.S. 210, 230).
6 This rule perhaps might have been based on general jurisdictional grounds; until a legislative order is in final, enforceable form, there is nothing to which an injunction will attach.
However, the reason given for the rule was "equitable fitness and propriety,'.' reduced in later
cases to "comity." The rule has been applied to legislative proceedings other than appeals to
courts, such as rehearings in commission, Palermo Land & Water Co. v. Railroad Commission
of California, 227 Fed. 708 (D.C.N.D. Cal. I915), appeal dismissed 225 Fed. 1022 (C.C.A. 9th
1915); Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Co. v. Blease, 42 F. (2d) 463 (D.C.E.D.S.C. 1930).
Other proceedings of administrative nature were pending in Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239
U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 6o L. Ed. x8i (i915), and Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Commission, 269 U.S. 278, 46 Sup. Ct. I12, 7o L. Ed. 273 (1925).
The rule has no application to a suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute which defines the
commission's powers. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 292, 53 L. Ed.
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On the other hand, the power of the revisory agency may be "judicial" in nature, confined to questions of the conformity of the order to constitutional and
statutory requirements, not its policy or expedience. The "legislative" process
is then deemed complete when the commission promulgates its order. Instead
of applying to a state court for relief, a litigant may, if proper jurisdictional
grounds exist, seek the assistance of a federal court, which is considered as com7
petent as any state court to pass on questions of a judicial nature.
Many states have constitutional or statutory provisions for the revision of
orders,8 but the language used is often ambiguous and shows that the draftsmen
did not have in mind the distinction drawn in the Prentiscase. As a result, the
application of the rule of that case to a particular statute may be difficult. If the
highest court of a state has held that the type of review intended is either "legislative" or "judicial," the federal courts will respect that decision, provided that
the state court's definition is not at variance with the federal concept of the two
types of review.9 But in the absence of any determinative decision by the state
tribunal, the federal courts must decide for themselves when the "legislative"
process is complete.
The question then becomes: what are the criteria of each of the two types of
review? It seems that the possible differentiating factors may be grouped as follows: (i) the scope of the revisory inquiry; (2) the form of the revisory proceeding; (3) the evidence which the revising agency may consider; (4) the power of
382 (i9o9). The rule is disregarded when, in the course of the legislative proceedings, there is a

violation of due process, such as undue delay, Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S.
587, 46 Sup. Ct. 408, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926); or refusal of supersedeas, either by statute, Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. x96, 44 Sup. Ct. 553, 68 L. Ed. 975 (1924), or by the reviewing body, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 353, 67 L. Ed.
659 (r923). See Lilienthal, supra note 3, 391, 399 1f.
7 Bacon v. Rutland R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34 Sup. Ct. 283, 58 L. Ed. 538 (1914). See
Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, 30 Yale L. Jour. 78x (1921).
8 See note, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 178 (X926) for a list, now perhaps only partial, of these states,
and a summary of the provisions. The present paper is confined, with few exceptions, to statutes which have been examined by the United States Supreme Court.
9 This was true in both the Prentis and Bacon cases, supra notes 5 and 7. Winchester & S.R.
Co. v. Commonwealth, io6 Va. 264, 55 S.E. 692 (i9o6); Bacon v. Boston & M.R.R., 83 Vt.
421, 457, 76 Ati. 128, 143 (i9IO). On the Virginia system, see Dobie, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Virginia, 8 Va. L. Rev. 477, 557 (1922).
The statute allowing appeals from the Illinois Commerce Commission has never been examined by the United States Supreme Court; however, the Illinois Supreme Court has definitely determined that the statute provides for "judicial" review. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat.
(1933) , C. iiia, § 87; People's Gas Co. v. City of Chicago, 309 I1. 40, 139 N.E. 867 (1923);
Wabash, C.&W. R.R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 309 Ill. 412, 41 N.E. 212 (1923). A provision that an order should not be set aside unless "against the manifest weight of the evidence"
has been declared unconstitutional, since the judicial test is whether there is any substantial
basis for the findings. Commerce Commission v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.L. Ry. Co., 309 Ill. 05,
I4O N.E. 868 (1923). See Smith, judicial Review of the Decisions of the Illinois Commerce
Commission, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 423 (1929).
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the revising agency to modify the commission's order (as distinguished from
affirmance or reversal in toto); and (5) the effect of the revising agency's determination as res judicata.
(i) The scope of the revisory inquiry. Direct statements as to the extent to
which it is intended the revising agency shall have power to examine the commission's order are extremely rare. The clearest expression is found in a New York
statute providing for review of the orders of the public service commission. The
issues to be considered on review are limited to: (a) the authority of the inferior
body to make the order; (b) the conformity of the order to law; (c) the competence of the proof taken; and (d) the consistency of the order with the weight
of the evidence.I0 This provision gives no power to consider the expedience of
the order; the revision contemplated is definitely "judicial."
Several other types of provisions, although often found, are not at clear. For
example, the reviewing agency may be directed to proceed as in chancery, and
make its decision as law or equity shall require.- Perhaps on its face such a proN.Y. Civil Practice Act (1927), § x304, 1305. See Prendergast v. New York Telephone
1o

Co., 262 U.S. 43,43 Sup. Ct. 466, 67 L. Ed. 853 (1923). Compare the Supreme Court's analysis
of "judicial" review in Interstate Commerce Commission. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U.S.
452, 470, 30 Sup. Ct. 155 , 16o, 54 L. Ed. 280 (igio).
Compare also the analogous situation existing under the appellate provisions of the Federal
Radio Act. The act of 1927, 44 Stat. i169 (1927), 47 U.S.C.A. Supp. §96 (933), allowing appeals from the Federal Radio Commission to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, was
construed to establish "legislative" review. As a result, no appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals, since the proceeding would be an original judicial action and would constitute an attempt to add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in
contravention of U.S. Const. Art. III. Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281
U.S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389, 74 L.Ed. 969 (1930); see Caldwell, Appeals from Decisions of the
Federal Radio Commission, i Jour. Air Law. 274, 276-279 (1930); notes, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 766
(i93i), i Jour. Air Law 353 (1930). Congress then amended the Radio Act to limit the review
of the Court of Appeals to "questions of law"; the fact findings of the commission to be "conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings ....
are arbitrary or capricious." 46
Stat. 844 (1930), 47 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 96 (i933). The Supreme Court readily recognized that
the section as amended provided for "judicial" review by the Court of Appeals; hence the proceedings before the Supreme Court were no longer original judicial proceedings, and constituted
part of the appellate jurisdiction of the court. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 808 (1933). Cf. act providing
for review of decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 36 Stat. 542 (1910), 38 Stat.
219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. 88 41 (28), 44-48, notes; Tollefson, Judicial Review of Decisions of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, ii Minn. L. Rev. 389, 504, 510 1f. (1927). See in general Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court,

35 Harv. L. Rev.

127 (1921).

Michigan: Comp. Laws (1929), § 11o42a; Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan R.R.
Commission, 235 U.S. 402, 35 Sup. Ct. 126, 59 L. Ed. 288 (i924). Minnesota: Laws (X921),
c. 278, § io; Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 635, 47
Sup. Ct. 489, 71 L. Ed. 807 (1927); Duluth v. Railroad & Warehouse Commission, 167 Minn.
311, 209 N.W. 10 (1926). Montana: Rev. Code (1921), § 4038, as amended Laws (193), c.
194, §3; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 52 Sup. Ct. 617, 76 L. Ed. 1226 (1932).
Pennsylvania:66 Purdon's Stats. (i93o) § 838; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,
253 U.S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (192o). Vermont: Acts (i9o8), No. 116, § 12;
Bacon v. Rutland R.R. Co., supra note 7.
21

NOTES

vision looks to a re-investigation of the facts only so far as is necessary to determine the legality of the order. But it is possible that the words "law" and
"equity" are used in the loose sense of "justness," which would at least admit
of the interpretation that the entire inquiry may be reopened, and questions of
expediency and policy determined.12
3
Frequently the reviewing agency is authorized to determine the "justness"'
or "reasonableness"14 or "lawfulness"s of the order. The first expression would
seem to point to "legislative" review, including an examination of the underlying policy of the order. "Reasonableness" seems so ambiguous that it provides
no clue either way: it might apply to the commission's exercise of discretion, or to
the consistency of the findings with the evidence. "Lawfulness" perhaps tends
to indicate that review of the legality, only, of the commission's findings is contemplated. The Supreme Court seems to attach no importance to these terms.
(2) The form of the revisory proceeding. A few statutes refer to the proceeding
to review an order as an "action,"' 6 thus perhaps implying an original, not an
appellate, proceeding. If original, the proceeding would seem to be "judicial"
in nature, since only a "legislative" inquiry would be an appeal from, and part
of, the commission's activities. The term, however, has been accorded little or
no weight, and the colorless word "proceeding" is probably as satisfactory.
Conversely, several statutes provide for an "appeal" from the order of the
commission.' 7 This word may be interpreted to refer to "legislative" proceedings, since it is a continuation of the activities of the commission, and not an
original suit; and such an interpretation is especially plausible when the statute
provides, as in Oklahoma, that the review by the state supreme court "shall
complete the appeal allowed by law" from the assessment proceedings before an
12In the analogous situation of review of the orders of the Public Utilities Commission of
the District of Columbia by the District Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has construed
the term "equity proceedings" to mean that a trial de novo may be conducted and such order
promulgated as the commission should have made, and has thus held the review is "legislative." 37 Stat. 974, 988 (1913); Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445,
67 L. Ed. 731 (1922).
s Monltana: supra note ii. Virginia: Const. (1902), § i56 f.
14 Michigan, Montana, Pensyirania:supra note ii. Ohio: Throckmorton's Code (1929),
§ 544; Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 5o Sup. Ct. 374, 74 L. Ed. 972
(1930); Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 92 Ohio St. 9, 1io N.E. 521
(i915); Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ioo Ohio St. 321, 126 N.E.
397 (igxg); note, 29 Mich. L. Rev. xo67 (1931). Virginia: supranote 13. Washington: Remington's Comp. Stat. (1922), § 10428; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, supra note 6;
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cushman, 292 Fed. 930 (C.C.A. 9th 1923), cert. den. Cushman v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 263 U.S. 729, 44 Sup. Ct. iti, 68 L. Ed. 529 (1924).
1sMichigan, Pennsylvania: supra note xi. Ohio, Washington: supra note 14.
16 Michigan, Montana: supra note i 2.
X"Minnesota: supra note ii. Ohio: supra note 14. Oklahoma: Stat. (1931), § 12661; Ex
parte Oklahoma, 37 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. ioth 1930); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Cornish,
65 F. (2d) 671 (C.A.A. xoth 1933); Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 23 Okla. 761, 98 Pac. 2002 (i9o8);
In re Earlsboro Assessment, 25 P. (2d) 632 (Okla. 1933). Vermont: supra note ii. Virginia:

Const.

(1902),

§ i56d.
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administrative board, and that this statutory provision "shall be construed to
give remedies and rights in addition to those of appeal heretofore given by statute, but the remedies of resort to the boards and appeal therefrom shall be the
sole remedies for the correction of assessment or equalization."'.8 In general
however, it seems probable that the word "appeal" is used in the loose sense of
invoking the aid of the revisory agency, and conveys no information as to the
type of proceeding contemplated.
The fact that the reviewing agency is authorized to grant a supersedeas, or
stay of enforcement, of the order pending review, 9 seems of little importance in
determining the character of review intended, although it may raise a question
20
of compliance with due process.
(3) The evidence which may be considered by the revising agency. The practice
has become quite general to confine the review of the commission's orders to the
transcript of the proceedings before the commission, and to exclude additional
evidence. 2 ' Such a limitation might seem to indicate that "legislative" review
was contemplated, since the orthodox theory of original "judicial" proceedings
requires that evidence be collected through the court's own fact-finding agencies.
To some extent this conclusion is sanctioned by the recent Supreme Court case
of Crowellv. Benson, 2 holding that, at least under the federal separation of powers, a reviewing court may not be confined to the transcript of commission proceedings in so far as "jurisdictional facts" are in issue, the existence of which is
a statutory condition precedent to the power of the commission to act. The decision was limited expressly to the federal constitutional system; but most state
governments are similar in structure and embody the same principles of an independent judiciary; hence Crowell v. Benson would seem to be a very persuasive
authority.
The limits of this "jurisdictional fact" doctrine are still undefined, and its apx8Okla. Stat. (1931), §§ 12661,

12663.

19Supersedeasis expressly permitted in New York, supranote iO; Ohio, supranote 14; Pennsylvania, supra note ii; and Washington, supra note 14, all of which have "judicial" review;
also in Virginia, Const. (1902), § i56e, where review is "legislative."
20 See supra note 6; also Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, supra note ii.
Cf. Banton v. Belt
Line Ry. Corp., 268 U.S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. 534, 69 L. Ed. 1020 (1925).
"Michigan: supra note ii. Nebraska: Comp. Stat. (x929), c. 75, § SOS; Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman, 6 F. (2d) 663 (D.C. Neb. 1925); Hooper Telephone Co. v.
Nebraska Telephone Co., 96 Neb. 245, 147 N.W. 674 (1914); see Durisch, Judicial Review of
the Railway Commission in Nebraska, ix Neb. L. Bull. 365, 371 (1932). Ohio: supranote 14.
Oklahozna: supranotes 17, 18. Pennsylvania: supranote ii. Virginia: supranote 13. Washinglon: supranote 14. Some statutes provide that if new evidence is offered, the court shall remand to the commission, for hearing on the new evidence; and if, as a result, the commission
shall revise its order, the revised order shall be substituted in the proceedings before the court.
See statutes of Michigan, Pennsylvania,and Virginia,supra.
285 U.S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson:
judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 8o
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. xo55 (1932); notes, 41 Yale L. Jour. 1037 (1932); 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1312
(1932); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 478 (1933); 32 Col. L. Rev. 738 (1932).

NOTES
plication to regulatory commissions has not yet been attempted; but it would
seem to extend at least to questions of the commission's power over the subject
matter of the proceeding, and over the parties thereto. Whether the theory will
be accepted by the state courts, however, seems doubtful, in view of the readiness with which they have accepted restriction to the transcript while holding
23
that the review provided for is "judicial" rather than "legislative" in nature.
It may also be doubted whether the Supreme Court would consider such a state
statutory provision a good criterion of "legislative" review.
On the other hand, state constitutional provisions for the separation of judicial and legislative powers appear, in several cases, to have been important
factors in determining that the review prescribed was "judicial" rather than
"legislative"; it is assumed that the state assembly, in according the power of review to a body exercising other functions undoubtedly judicial in nature, intended to comply with the constitutional requirements; and ambiguous language
therefore is construed to contemplate "judicial "review.24
(4) The power of the revising agency to modify the commission's order. An expression often noticed in the statutes is that the reviewing agency may "modify"
the order of the commission, as an alternative to either affirming or reversing it
as a whole.2s This perhaps means that the reviewing body may make a thorough
revision of the order on the basis of policy and expediency, perhaps conceding
the legality of the commission's original action; such review would be "legislative.' 6 The term "modify" is so general, however, that it may well be construed to limit the power of the revising agency to removing provisions considered illegal, without reference to questions of policy or expediency. As a result, it is not surprising that modification provisions are found in statutes interpreted to prescribe "judicial" as well as "legislative" review.27
The same interpretation would be made, probably, if the word "substitute"
was used in place of "modify." The Virginia Constitution provides that the Court
23 Restriction specifically held valid in Illinois, Commerce Commission v. Cleveland, C., C.
& St. L. Ry. Co., supra note 9.
24 See cases cited: Michigan, supra note ii; Nebraska, supra note 2X; Vermont, supra
note ix; Washington, supra note 14. In Ohio, the Constitution (1912), Art. IV, § 2, provides
that the supreme court shall have "such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers as may be conferred by law." *
Is Minnesota, Montana: supranote ix. Nebraska: supranote 2x. New York: supranote i o.
Ohio: supra note 14. Oklahoma: supra note 17. Pennsylania:supra note i1.
26 The Montana statute, supra note ii,
was construed by the United States Supreme Court
as providing "legislative" review, the court relying mainly upon the term "modify" in the
statute (Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, supranote i i).Other expressions in the statute seemed
to point the other way, however, and the Montana Constitution, Art. IV, § i, provides for
separation of powers [its effect perhaps weakened by O'Neill v. Yellowstone Irrig. Dist., 44
Mont. 492, 121 Pac. 283 (1912); and see State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 Pac.

392 (1913)].

27"Judicial": Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania. "Legislative": Montana,
Oklahoma.
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of Appeals "is to substitute such order as, in its opinion, the commission should
have made."' 8 Due perhaps to the addition of the last clause, this provision
seems to point toward revision on grounds of expediency, and in fact has been so
interpreted.29
(5)The effect of the revising agency's decision. If adequately expressed, the in-

tention of the state legislature as to whether or not the decision of the revising
agency was intended to be resjudicatawould probably provide a good test of the
nature of the review provided. The present statutes, however, afford little information on this point. In Virginia it is stipulated that the right to sue in "ordinary courts" is not impaired by the revisory system created, indicating perhaps
that the decision of the revising tribunal is not intended to be res judicata.3° An
Oklahoma statute provides that it "shall be construed to give remedies and
rights in addition to those of appeal heretofore given by statute";31 this, too,
seemingly contemplates that- the action of the revisory agency is not final. In
both states the review provided has been determined to be of the "legislative"
type.3
FRED M.
Is

Va. Const.

(1902),

MERRIFIELD

§ i56g. This section was not changed in the constitutional revision of

1928.

29See Winchester

& S.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 9.
Const. (1902), § i 5 6h. Compare the federal statute providing for appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, 16 Stat. 204 (1870), 35 U.S.C.A. § 62 (1929): "But no
30 Va.

opinion or decision of the court in such case shall preclude any person interested from the right
to contest the validity of such patent in any court wherein the same may be called in question."
See Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 47 Sup. Ct. 284, 71 L. Ed. 478
(1927). See also, as to res judicata, Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, supra note 14.
3' Supra note i8.
32Cases

cited supra notes 5, 9, 17.
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CHANGING RULES OF EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
At common law,' interested witnessesl were not permitted to testify in their
own behalf in civil or criminal4 cases. Spouses, for additional reasons of policy,5
were held incompetent to testify either for or against each other 6 Prior to statutory modifications of these common law rules of competency 7 there was unaniI Prior to the development of the modem jury trial, questions of competency of witnesses
did not arise since the jury found a verdict of their own knowledge. For the development of the
jury, see Hinton, Cases on Evidence (2d ed. 193), c. i, § 1; I Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923),
985; 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926), 178-185.
The interest disqualification was based on the theory that interested persons were biased
and hence not credible; also the courts were unwilling to subject the interested witness to the
temptation to commit perjury. New Arcade v. Owens, 258 Fed. 965 (D.C. Ct. App. 1919);
Skahen v. Strauss, 199 Ill. App. 4o3 (y916); Gilbert, Evidence ( 4 th ed. 1777) ii9. For some
exceptions to the interest disqualification because of necessity see United States v. Clark, 96
U.S. 37, 24 L. Ed. 696 (1877). Parmelee v. McNulty, 19 Ill. 556 (1858); County v. Leidy, io
Pa. 45 (1848).
To disqualify, the interest had to be "some legal, certain and immediate interest in the result of the suit itself, or in the record thereof as an instrument of evidence to support his own
claims." Poe v. Dorrah, 2o Ala. 288 (1852); Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 356, 5 L. Ed. 472
(1822); Ackman v. Potter, 239 Ill. 578, 88 N.E. 231 (1909).
Parties to the suit were of course directly interested as thus defined. For others who were
considered disqualified because of interest, see i Wigmore, supra note i, 996 if; 5 Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence (i916), § 3669; Jones, Evidence (3d ed. 1924), c. 20.
2 By 1582 the rule in civil cases was well established, Dymoke's Case, Savile 34, pl. 18.
Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 209, ioL. Ed. 129 (1839); Marks v. Butler, 24 Ill. 568 (186o);
2

Frear v. Everton, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 142 (1822); Radtke v. Taylor, io5 Ore. 559,
(1922); i Wigmore, supra note i, 99o ff.

210

Pac. 863

4 Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89 (1864); Harwell v. State, io Lea (Tenn.) 544 (1882). The
disqualification developed later in criminal cases than in civil. x Wigmore, supra note i, 995
n. 42; 9 Holdsworth, supra note i, 196. The complaining witness or prosecutor was not excluded under the rule since neither were parties to the record. Best, Evidence ( 4 th ed. i866),

238.
5 The reasons usually given: i. Likelihood of false testimony because of a common interest.
Merriam v. Hartford Ry. Co., 20 Conn. 354 (i85o); Gilbert, Law of Evidence ( 4 th ed. 1777),
133. 2. Metaphysical unity. Coke Litt. 6b, Wigmore, Cases on Evidence ( 3 d ed. 1932), i6.
3. Public policy to prevent marital disharmony. Mitchinson v. Cross, 58 Ill. 366 (1871); Bird
v. Davis, 14 N.J. Eq. 467 (x862).
6 Civil cases: Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 2o9, io L. Ed. 129 (x839); Schreffler v.
Chase, 245 Ill. 395, 92 N.E. 272 (1910).
Criminal cases: Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189,41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 L. Ed. 214
(1920); Barber v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903); Wilke v. People, 53 N.Y. 525 (1873).
That the incompetency was absolute and did not rest on privilege see Stein v. Bowman, 13
Pet. (U.S.) 209, io L. Ed. 129 (1839); Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (19o9); but see
Ficken v. State, 97 Ga. 813, 25 S.E. 925 (1895).
7
a. The first outstanding attack on the exclusionary rules of evidence was made by Bentham in 1827. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. IX, pt. 3; I Wigmore, supra, note
i, 997, 1002; Appleton, Evid. (x86o), c. i, 4; Phil. Evid. (sth Am. ed.), 24 f.

b. Civil Cases.
In England the interest disqualification for witnesses was not removed until 1843 (St. 6 & 7

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

mous agreement both among the various states and between federal and state
courts as to the inadmissibility of such evidence. 8
In civil cases, this uniformity between federal and state courts as to competency of witnesses continued despite the legislative abolition by the states of
the common law testimonial disqualifications,9 by operation of conformity
statutes 0 directing the federal courts to follow state rules of evidence.
Vict. c. 85) by Lord Denman's Act, which specifically excepted parties to the suit and spouses.
Parties to the action were not made competent in civil cases until 185i. St. i4 & i5 Vict. c. 99.
In the United States the development came later. i Wigmore, id., oo4, note 4 and § 488.
Parties and witnesses were not made competent in the Federal courts until x864. Rev. Stat.
§ 858, 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (as amended). Monongahela National Bank v. Jacobus, iog U.S.
275, 3 Sup. Ct. 219, 27 L. Ed. 935 (1883); De Beaumont v. Webster, 8i Fed. 535 (C.C.A. 3 d
1897). For other cases see 28 U.S.C.A. 631.
Today the disqualification has everywhere disappeared. i Wigmore, id., ioo4, the various
state statutes being listed at p. 870.
c. Criminal Cases.
The abolition of the interest disqualification in criminal cases came later both in America
and England. For suggested explanations see i Wigmore, id., ioog.
In England the defendant was not competent until i898. St. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § x;Rex v.
Wheeler, [1916] 1 K.B. 283. Best, Evidence (8th ed. 1916), § 822 A.
In the federal courts the defendant was made competent in 1878. 20 Stat. 30 (1878),
28 U.S.C.A. 632 (1928). For state statutes see x Wigmore, id., § 488.
d. Spouses.
Incompetency of spouses was not abolished by statute in civil cases in England until x853
(St. i6 & 17 Vict. c. 83, § 4; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, § 3, i869), and in criminal cases not until 1898
(St. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § x)all of which are reprinted in i Wigmore, supra, note i, § 488.
In the United States the removal occurred later. x Wigmore, id., io36. Civil Cases: In re
Domenig, 128 Fed. 146 (D.C.Pa. i9o4); Brown v. Norton, 67 Ind. 424 (1879); Shepard v.
Parker, 97 Me. 86, 53 Atl. 879 (1902); Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572, 26 Atl. 755 (1893). Criminal Cases: Walker v. State, 34 Fla. 167, i6 So. 8 (1894); Commonwealth v. Moore, 162 Mass.
44i, 38 N.E. 1120 (1894); People v. Hovey, 92 N.Y. 554 (1883); State v. Reynolds, 48 S.C. 384,
26 S.E 679 (1896) (spouse permitted to testify against her husband).
Some states require the consent of the other spouse. In re Holt, 56 Minn. 33 (1893); Hubbell v. Grant, 39 Mich. 641 (1878); Stanley v. Stanley, 27 Wash. 570 (1902); State v. Willis,
119 Mo. 485 (1894).
8 See cases supra, note 7.
9 See supra, note 7.
10All the applicable statutes will be included in this note for convenient reference.
a. 12 Stat. 588, Act "of July i6, 1862, c. I8q, § x; as amended Rev. Stat. 858 (I9O6), 28
U.S.C.A. 631 (1928):
"The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit or proceeding in the courts
of the United States shall be determined by the laws of the State or Territory in which the court
is held."
In its original wording the section was construed not to apply to federal criminal trials.
The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, 25 L. Ed. 168 (1878) ; Logan v. United States, x44 U.S. 263, 30I
ft., 12 Sup. Ct. 617,36 L. Ed. 429 (1892); Hendrix v. United States 219 U.S. 79,31 Sup. Ct. 193,
55 L. Ed. 102 (igiO). The same is true of the section in its present form. Adams v. United

States,
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(C.C.A. 8th i919).

b. 17 Stat. 197, Act of June i, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 28 U.S.C.A. 724 (1928):
"The practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil cases, other than equity
or admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice,
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In criminal cases, on the other hand, a divergence soon appeared due to decisions which prevented state statutory liberalizations of rules of competency
from being reflected in the federal courts," by holding that the various conformity acts did not apply to criminal prosecutions.12 Conflicting interpretations of these and other applicable Supreme Court cases, however, created some
uncertainty as to the law which should control,3 though all agreed on the negative proposition that the law which did govern competency in federal criminal
cases was not affected by subsequent state statutes.' 4 Three bodies-of law were
suggested: (i) The common law rules of evidence fixed unchangeably (in the
absence of further congressional action) as they existed in 1789, the date of the
passage of the Judiciary Act. 5 This view was followed by the majority of
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts
of record of the State within which such district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."
By its terms this section applies only to civil proceedings.
c. i Stat. 92, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 34, as amended Rev. St. 721 (1878), 28 U.S.C.A.
725 (r928):

"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
This section as construed by the federal courts does not apply to rules of evidence in criminal
prosecutions. United States v. Reid, 12 How., (U.S.) 361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i8sx); Logan v.
United States, i44 U.S. 263, 3oo, 12 Sup. Ct. 617,36 L. Ed. 429 (1892); American Ry. Express
Co. v. Rowe, 14 F. (2d) 269 (C.C.A. Xst 1926), cert. denied 273 U.S. 743, 47 Sup. Ct. 336, 71
L. Ed. 869 (1927).
The courts are divided on the question of whether this section compels them to follow state
rules of evidence in civil cases. Holding that it does are Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 378, 1o
L. Ed. 209 (1839); Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554, 33 L. Ed. 9o9 (189 o ); Stewart v. Morris, 89 Fed. 290 (C.C.A. 7th 1898); Von Crome v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 1x F.(2d) 350
(C.C.A. 8th 1926). For other cases see 28 U.S.C.A. § 725 (1928), note 84. Contra, explaining
away the Supreme Court decisions, are Union Pacific Rr. Co. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584 (C.C.A. 8th
1897); Gilbert v. American Surety Co., 121 Fed. 499 (C.C.A. 7th 1902), cert. denied 190 U.S.
56o, 23 Sup. Ct. 855, 47 L. Ed. 1184 (iqo3); Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed.
329 (C.C.A. 8th 19o5). For other cases-see 28 U.S.C.A. 725, note 83.
d. For other related statutes and statutory chronology of those cited above see Sweeney,
Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Inl. L. Rev. 394, 400 (1932).
"lThus in Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (C.C.A. 2d 1919), the wife of the defendant
was not permitted to testify in his behalf in the federal courts, though she would have been
competent in a prosecution in the state court under People v. Hovey, 92 N.Y. 554 (1883).
"2 Cases and statutes, supra note io.
13See cases infra, notes x5, 16, 17. The leading Supreme Court cases will be discussed in
detail below. See also Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Ill.
L. Rev. 394, 400 (932).
'4

See cases infra, notes 15, i6, 17.

SThe cases following this view purport to rely upon United States v. Reid, 12 How. (U.S.)
361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i85i). The validity of this interpretation will be discussed subsequently.
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courts., 6

(2) The rules of evidence fixed unchangeably (in the absence of further congressional legislation) as they existed in the individual state at the time
of it admission into the Union, thus including whatever statutory changes in
the common law the territorial legislatures had enacted before such admission.' 7
(3) A third view refused, to regard the rules of evidence as crystallized into immobility and declared that the courts had power to modify the common law
rules (even in the absence of Congressional action) when necessitated by changing societal conditions. 5
Up to 1933 the results of the operation of these tendencies were these: In
civil cases virtually all the states had abolished the common law disqualifications of witnesses and spouses. Since this was reflected in the federal courts by
the conformity acts, there was uniformity both among the federal courts themselves and between the federal and state courts as to rules of competency in
civil cases. In criminal cases state statutes abolishing incompetency were not
thus reflected, and since three dissimilar views were adopted as stated above,
conflicting rules of competency prevailed not only between federal and state
courts but among the various federal courts themselves. This divergence was
not bridged by federal legislation. 9
At the October 1933 term, in Funk v. United States,"° the Supreme Court conclusively affirmed the power of the federal courts to modify the common law
rules of evidence without statutory assistance by'Congress, and definitely re6 United States v. Hal], 53 Fed. 352 (D.C.Pa. 1892); United States v. Hughes, 175 Fed. 238
(D.C.W.D.Pa. igio); Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327 (C.C.A. 8th 1913); Fisher v. United
States, 32 F. (2d) 602 (W.C.C.A. 4th 1929); Barton v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 967 (C.C.A. 4th
1928); Scaffidi v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 203 (C.C.A. Ist 1930).

Brown v. United States,,233 Fed. 353 (C.C.A. 6th 1916) (dictum); McCoy v. United States,
Fed. 861 (witness convicted of a felony held competent because the territorial legislature,
prior to the admission of the state into the Union, had removed the disqualification); Ding v.
United States, 247 Fed. 12 (C.C.A. 9th igi8) (atheist held competent for the same reason);
Rendleman v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 27 (C.C.A. 9th 1927) (wife held competent for same
reason).
'7
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18Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 406 (igi8). The authority of this case was considered to be questionable in view of subsequent cases. See Leach, State
Law of Evidence in Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 565 (1930). Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933) affirms the Rosen case, however. Both will be discussed
in detail below.
19Where Congress has passed specific legislation, such provisions control, Cohen v. United
States, 214 Fed. 23 (C.C.A. 9th 2924), cert. denied 235 U.S. 696, 35 Sup. Ct. I9g; Parker v.
United States, 3 F. (2d) 903 (C.C.A. 9th 1925). For example, the defendant in a criminal case
is made a competent witness in the federal courts regardless of the state law by 2o Stat. 30
(2878), 28 U.S.C.A. § 632 (1928).
In 1887 Congress made competent the spouse of a defendant in a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Act of March 3, 2887, c. 397, § 1, 28 U.S.C.A. 633 (1928). This was the sole legislation on the subject during the period.
2oFunk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (i933), where a wife was permitted
to testify for her husband in a criminal case. At common law she would have been incompetent.
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jected the views which held the rules of competency were fixed unalterably as of
any one time.
Funk v. United States will therefore have a threefold effect on rules of evidence in criminal cases: (i) It will level off the differences between federal and
state courts on rules of competency, by bringing the federal law into conformity
with those of a great majority of the states. (2) It will also make for uniformity
among the various federal courts since it definitely overrules the view that the
federal rules of evidence are those which existed in each state at the time of its
admission into the Union. (3) It frees the federal courts from the anomalous
necessity, under modem conditions, of following the common law rules of 1789,
and by rejecting the doctrine that such adherence was mandatory, lays down a
principle which will permit further development in the same direction. The
court based this principle, however, upon an interpretation of the prior Supreme
Court cases which resulted in the uncertainty and conflict already described.
In order to permit further growth without the confusion which attended that
growth heretofore, and because of its importance in the future development of
the law of evidence the principle requires a clear enunciation and restatement.
The primary cause of the confusion was a misunderstanding of the scope of
the decision in the case which first raised the direct question of the proper rules
of evidence to be applied in criminal cases in the federal courts, United States v.
Reid2" (decided in 1851). This was a criminal prosecution brought in a federal
court in Virginia, and involved the competency of a witness to testify for the
defendant. The witness would have been incompetent at common law, but
under a statute passed in Virginia some sixty years after the federal Judiciary
Act he became competent to testify in the state courts. Thus the question was
presented whether such state statute would be given any effect in the federal
courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that:
The laws of the several States ....

shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at

common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
The Supreme Court decided the Act did not apply to criminal cases22 and that the
witness was incompetent, holding that Congress by this section of the Judiciary
States v. Reid, 12 How. (U.S.) 361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i851).
" We are not interested here in the question of the correctness of this interpretation by the
Reid case. i Wigmore, supra note z, § 6 calls this an indefensible construction. See also Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 556 (1930). Chief Justice
Taney reasoned that Congress intended by the act to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts,
without which they could not have administered the laws of the states, and that the wording
would have to be more definite to include the rules of evidence of the states, since so to hold
would be to "place the criminal jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control of another."
From that premise he reasoned by a process of elimination that Congress could not have intended the common law of England to control, nor the common law of the colonies, and that
"the only known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to have been in the minds of the
men who framed these acts of Congress, was that which was then in force in the respective states
[at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789], and which they were accustomed to see in daily and
familiar practice in the state courts." 22 How. (U.S.) 361, 365, i3 L. Ed. r023, 1025 (i85I).
21United
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Act had directed the federal courts to apply the rules of evidence in force "in the
respective states" at the time that Act was passed, 1789, and that the common
law rules so adopted and established could not be changed by subsequent state
legislation.
This decision was implicitly understood to mean that in the absence of a new
statutory direction by Congress the rules of evidence were fixed unchangeably
as they existed in 1789. The line of reasoning by which this result was reached
may be articulated thus:
The Reid case decided (i) that Congress had in the judiciary Act directed the
federal courts to follow the common law rules of competency of 1789, and (2) that
subsequent state statutes could not change those rules.
Abolition of incompetency was effected solely through state statutes which under
(2) left the federal rule unchanged.
Any decision which would attempt to abolish a common law disqualification without
action by Congress, therefore, would be erroneous, since it would be contrary to the
Reid case and would be disregarding the judiciary Act.
Therefore the -rules of evidence in the federal courts are fixed unchangeably as
they were in 1789 unless Congress chooses to modify them by statute.
A court which so understood the Reid case would consequently feel compelled
to overrule it, in part, to justify a change in the common law rules of competency. And conversely, a court which, in abolishing a common law rule of competency, felt it necessary to overrule the Reid case, would implicitly indicate
that it had so interpreted the Reid case, whether it had articulated the line of
reasoning or not. The first Supreme Court to clearly demonstrate this implicit
analysis was Rosen v. United States23 in which the court said:
While the decision in United States v. Reid has not been specifically overruled, its
authority must be regarded as seriously shaken .....
24

23 Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 4o6 (r918). The question
raised was as to the competency, in a federal court in New York, of a witness previously convicted of a felony in the state courts of New York. The court believed it was overruling the
common law rule by holding the witness competent and decided the question "in the light
of sound reason."
Professor Hinton points out in 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 545, 551 (1928) that the case could have been
decided upon the ground that the conviction was by a court of a different sovereignty and that
by the common law rule such a conviction did not make the witness incompetent, citing Brown
v. United States, 233 Fed. 353 (C.C.A. 6th i916), L.R.A. ii 7 A, 1133 (note).
24 The Rosen case relies upon two prior Supreme Court decisions to justify its conclusion
that the Reid case was not sound law, discerning in them an inconsistency with the holding in
the Reid case:
(i) Logan v. United States, i44 U.S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429 (1892), which
raised the converse of the issue in the Rosen case, the witness being competent at common law,
but incompetent under a statute of Texas passed after it had come into the Union. While it
was a republic, Texas had adopted the common law in general terms. In upholding the competency of the witness in the federal court of Texas in a criminal trial, the Supreme Court opinion said:
......the competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the courts of the United States held
within the State of Texas is not governed by a statute of the State which was first enacted in
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Funk v. United States confirms this analysis.25 By so interpreting the Reid
case however, Rosen v. United States presented a distorted picture of the decision (which the Funk case perpetuates), since it implied that the Reid case intended to anchor the laws of evidence as they existed in 1789. This, it may be
suggested, the Reid case did not purport to do, and to so understand the decision demonstrates a subtle misconception of the nature of the common law
which has confused the cases in the past and may cause trouble in the future.
And it creates the apparent incongruity of state statutes automatically becomx85g, but, except so far as Congress has made specific provisions upon the subject, is governed
by the commuon law, which, as has been seen, was the law of Texas before the passage of that statute
and at the time of the admission of Texas into the Union as a state."
All the cases which adopt the view that competency is governed by the rules of evidence as
they existed in the individual states at the time of their admission to the Union (see supra, note
17) rely upon the italicized part of the quotation given above. When read in its context, however, this passage does not seem to justify that interpretation, though there is some difference
of opinion on the point. Professor Hinton in 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 545, 551 (1928) suggests that the
case does not conflict with United States v. Reid. Acc. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the
Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562 (1930); Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds,
dissenting in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 473, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, x51, 62 L. Ed. 406,
408 (1918). A contrary view is taken by Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 394, 414 (1932), and Justice Clarke speaking for the majority in
Rosen v. United States, id., 470.
(2) Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 Sup. Ct. 6o, 36 L. Ed. 99x (1892), which involved the competency of a joint indictee as a witness for the prosecution in a separate trial of
his co-indictee in a federal court. The Reid case had raised the same question with regard to a
witness called by the defendant. In answering the defendant's contention that the Reid case
was decisive of the case before it, the court in the Benson case said:
"The precise question in that case [United States v. Reid] was as to the right of the defendant to call his co-defendant, and not that of the government to call the co-defendant, and a
distinction has been taken between the two cases ..... And as the distinction prevailed,
whether founded on satisfactory reasons or not, it is sufficient to justify us in holding that that
case is not decisive of this..... We do not feel ourselves, therefore, precluded by that case
from examining this question in the light of general authority and sound reason."
The court then pointed out the great changes in competency wrought by statute, all tending
toward a liberalization of the strict common law rules, and continued: "The spirit of this legislation has controlled the decisions of the courts ..... " The court's lengthy discussion of this
point may indicate an incipient dissatisfaction with the state of the existing rules of evidence,
but the decision does not seem to overrule the Reid case. The court was only deciding what the
common law rule was on the question before it.
25 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 214 (1933) adopts the interpretation
of the Reid case given in Rosen v. United States:
"..... it is plain enough that the ultimate doctrine announced is that in the taking of testimony in criminal cases, the federal courts are bound by the rules of the commuon law as they existed at a definitely specified time in the respectivestates.
"With the conclusion that the controlling rule is that of the common law, the Benson case
and the Rosen case do not conflict; but both cases reject the notion, which the [Reid case seems]
to accept, that the courts, in the face of greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been
wrought in the common law itself by force of these changed conditions."
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ing federal common law.26 A clarification of what the Reid case stands for
shows that it need not cause these difficulties.
The principles implicitly or expressly laid down by the Reid case may be separated as follows: (i) that Congress could prescribe the rules as to competency
of witnesses which should be followed in the federal courts; (2) that Congress
did not direct the federal courts in criminal cases to follow contemporary state
rules of evidence; (3) that Congress had impliedly directed the federal courts to
follow those rules of the common law in force "in the respective states"2 7 at
the time the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed; (4) that state statutes passed
subsequent to 1789 would not be binding upon the federal courts. If there is
any inconsistency between the Reid case on the one hand and the Rosen and
Funk cases on the other, it must result from the implied Congressional mandate
that the federal courts were to follow the rules of evidence in force in the re6The following quotation from an article written before the Funk case was decided concretely illustrates this difficulty:
"No case was cited in the opinion [of the Rosen case] .... in which a court without express
legislative authority abolished the common law disqualification ..... And independent investigation has failed to reveal such a case. The Rosen case must, therefore, rest upon the principle that state legislation, whose tendency perhaps has been followed in federal legislation not
directly applicable to the case in hand, creates a weight of authority which the federal courts
may and must follow. That such a holding is revolutionary need hardly be suggested." Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562 (1930).
Though it is often said that there is no federal common law, a realistic view must recognize
it exists in the sense of "a- general common law existing throughout the United States, not, it
is true as a body of law distinct from the common law enforced in the states, but as containing
the general rules and principles." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call, 181 U.S. 92, 21 Sup.
Ct. 56i, 45 L. Ed. 765 (19O1).
27 It is not altogether clear what the Reid case meant by this phrase. On the one hand there
is strong language in the case which specifically refers to the law of the individual state. On
the other hand, in support of the view that a general body of common law was meant (see
supra, note 26), it may be suggested (1) that the state laws were uniform at the time the Reid'
case was adopted and that the court consequently did not have a situation before it which required more precise language; (2) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i, lo L. Ed. 865 (1842) had been on
the books for ten years, holding that common law decisions in the individual states did not control the federal courts in certain substantive law fields. It seem incongruous to consider the
federal courts not bound to follow individual state rules when substantive law is involved and
a statute expressly directs the court to consider the "laws of the several states" as rules of decision (see supra, note io, c. for full text of the statute), and yet hold that when rules of evidence are involved, the laws of the individual states must be followed in the federal courts, even
though the statute involved in Swift v. Tyson was held inapplicable.
If this phrase is construed to have meant a general common law, Logan v. United States
supra note 24, may be treated as having applied the same rule as the Reid case, since it could
be held to prevail in each state upon entering the Union, not as the common law of the state,
but as the general common law of the whole country. Whether the Logan case adopts a distinct rule for the newer states or merely applies the rule of the Reid case, and whether the
Reid case adopts the rules of the individual states or a general body of common law does not
affect the validity of the subsequent analysis. The view will be adopted, however, that a general common law was adopted by the Reid case and that the Logan case is not inconsistent with
it. The recent cases so treat it. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212; Wolfle v.
United States, 29 o U.S. 617, 54 Sup. Ct. 279 (1934).
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spective states in 1789, since all three cases are in accord as to the other principles. Clearly if the Reid case is to be interpreted as deciding that the rules of
evidence in the federal courts were anchored unchangeably as they existed in
1789 unless Congress chooses to modify them, the Funk case is inconsistent,
since it changes a common law rule without Congressional action in permitting
8
a spouse to testify in a criminal trial.2
That the Reid case should not be so interpreted can be shown by comparing
29
it to express statutory adoptions of the common law such as the Illinois statute
.... The common law of England so far as the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and all statutes .... prior to the fourth year of James the First .... shall
be the rule of decision .....
It has never been intimated that this section, which is substantially enacted
or judicially adopted in most of the states of the Union, crystallizes the rules of
evidence as of the time of James the First, or of the adoption of such statute, and
permits no additions or modifications.30 On the contrary, as both the Funk and
Rosen case recognize, one of the essential principles of the common law is the
power of growth.3'
If Congress, therefore, by a similar provision had in express words directed
the federal courts to follow the common law rules of evidence as they existed in
the respective states in 1789, it can hardly be questioned that such a statute
would not have been construed to paralyze the common law into immobility.
What the Reid case did, was to find by implication what such a statute would
have provided expressly. And there is no reason for holding the common law
to be unchangeably fixed because of an implied adoption when an express adoption would permit growth and change.
2 Funk v. United States, supra note 20. In reaching this result Justice Sutherland re-examined the bases of the spouses' disqualification at common law-interest and public policy(see supra, note 5) and showed their inapplicability in the light of "legislation and modem
thought." Competency of a wife to testify against her husband was not involved, and the
court expressly refused to decide that question.
The Funk case overrules Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65
L. Ed. 214 (1920) which did not cite the Rosen case as necessitating any change. See also
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 31 Sup. Ct. 193, 55 L. Ed. X02 (1910).
c. 28.
29 Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (933),
23On the contrary, as an Illinois court has pointed out in discussing this statute:
" ... they [the English courts] have made many innovations upon its original principles,
and .... many of them have become much modified or wholly changed. The courts of the
several States have also taken advantage of its pliant nature, in which consists one of its greatest excellencies, and adapted it to the evervarying exigencies of the country, and to the everchanging conditions of society. This results from necessity; and in our further progressive improvement, other and more extensive modifications will be effected." Boyer v. Sweet, 3 Scam.

(Ill.) 120 (1841).
3' The Rosen case itself shows this most strongly since without a statute it overthrew what
was unquestionably the common law rule of 1789 by holding a convicted felon to be a competent witness; and the Funk case stresses the same point: The "rules [of the common law] are
modified upon its own principles and not in violation of them." (Cited from People v. Randolph, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. (N.Y.) 174, 177).
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The Reid case in short, must be understood to have enunciated a simple,
sensible rule-Congress had directed the federal courts to follow in criminal
cases the rules of evidence of the common law of 1789. One of the essential principles of the law thus adopted as a rule of decision was the capacity to change
and grow.
With this rule of the Reid case, the holdings in the Rosen and Funk cases do
not conflict. They exemplify it; and reaffirm its validity. And in the light of
this analysis the apparent dilemma of state statutes becoming federal common
law dissolves,32 since in the process of growth the common law may be influenced by the same philosophical ideas and societal changes which lead legislatures to pass statutes abolishing disqualifications of witnesses. That the legislature reacts more quickly to the stimuli should not be considered to preempt the
field and to inhibit the natural development of the common law so as to prevent
it from reaching the same result. In fact it is entirely proper for the courts to
consider widespread legislation as one of the best indications that societal opinion has been modified.
Thus understood the words of the court in the Funk case take on a new significance when they state:
The final question to which we are thus brought .... is the question of the power of
these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to
declare and effectuate upon common law principles, what is the present rule upon a
given subject in the light of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to
what has previously been declared and practiced. It has been said so often as to
have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by
its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.
If adhered to in its unconfused simplicity, the same principle will occasion
no difficulty in years to come when further changes necessitate reconsideration
of present rules of evidence.33
AnoLPr A. RuBmNSON
THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS BY BANKS TO
REPURCHASE SECURITIES
The case of Knass v. Madison &-Kedzie State Bank, is a typical sequel to cer-

tain banking excesses of the last decade.2 Defendant bank had sold securities to
complainant, and had agreed to repurchase' the securities at par or a slight dis32Supra, note 26.
33 The potentialities of the Funk case can already be discerned in the recognition of its application to rules of admissibility of testimony other than those relating to competency of witnesses. Wolfie v. United States, 29o U.S. 617, 54 Sup. Ct. 279 (1934).
x354 Ill. 554, 188 N.E. 836 (r933).
2 See Fribourg, The New York Mortgage Bond Situation, The Annalist (Dec. 22, 1933),
8o3; Williams, The Future of Mortgage Banking, Great Lakes Banker (Feb. 1934), 3.
3 The agreements were signed by a vice-president of defendant bank, generally without any
designation of official position or descriptiopersonae.
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count. At various times defendant did repurchase a portion of the securities;
finally, however, it refused to perform its agreement. Complainant then instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement, joining as defendants
the bank, a receiver appointed for it, and a successor bank to which all the assets of the old bank had been assigned for purposes of liquidation. The lower
court held the repurchase agreements were enforceable against the vendor bank
alone,4 and both complainant and defendant appealed. Two main problemss
were thus presented to the Illinois Supreme Court: (x) Were the agreements enforceable against the vendor bank? (2) If the vendor bank was liable on the
agreements, is the successor bank also liable? The Court based its decision almost wholly on its solution to the first problem, holding the agreements ultra
vires and unenforceable against the old bank, and thus unenforceable against
the new bank.
By statute in Illinois banking institutions may be created "for the purpose of
discount and deposit, buying and selling exchange and doing a general banking
business ....and such banks or banking associations shall have the power to
'
loan money on personal and real estate security and accept and execute trusts.

6

As a bank incorporated under legislative sanction has only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied from the statute under which it is created,7 the
capacity of defendant bank to enter into repurchase agreements must be justified by reference to the terms of this general statute. The Supreme Court held
that a promise to repurchase securities was not within the powers enumerated
by the statute, and that there was no showing that such promises were part of
any general banking practices. Thus the contract to repurchase was ultra
vires.
But determination that a contract is ultra vires does not per se preclude
its enforcement; in many cases the corporate promisor may be estopped to
deny its lack of capacity. 8 The Illinois court also found that the promises
4 Knass

L. Rev.

v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill.
App. 588 (1933), noted in i Univ. Chi.

343 (i933).

S A subsidiary problem also presented was as to whether defendant bank had actually signed
the agreements, inasmuch as only the signature of one of its vice-presidents appeared on the
face of the bills of sale (see supranote 3). The court might have held that the agreements were
the personal obligation of the vice-president who signed, and not of defendant bank. See
Mead v. Altgeld, i36 Ill.
298, 26 N.E. 388 (i89i); Kinser v. Cal. Fire Clay Co., i65 Ill.
5o5,
46 N.E. 372 (897); Braun v. Hess, 187 Ill.
283, 58 N.E. 371 (x9oo); Murray v. Standard Pecan
Co., 309 Ill.
226, i4o N.E. 834 (1923); 4 Michie, Banks and Banking (Penn. ed. 193), §§ 7,43.
6 Ill.
Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), c. 16a, § i.
7 Ballantine, Corporations

(1927),

§ 53; 4 Michie, Banks and Banking (Penn. ed. 1931), § I.

8 Logan Co. Nat. Banlkv. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 11 Sup. Ct. 496, 35 L. Ed. 107 (1891); Aldrich v. Chemical Nat. Bank, x76 U.S. 618, 20 Sup. Ct. 498, 44 L. Ed. 611 (igoo); Citizen's
Central Nat. Bank. v. Appleton, 216 U.S. 296, 30 Sup. Ct. 364, 54 L. Ed. 443 (i9io); Rankin
v. Emigh, 218 U.S. 27, 30 Sup. Ct. 672, 54 L. Ed. 915 (i9io); Farmers' and Merchants' Nat..
Bank v. Smith, 77 Fed. 129 (C.C.A. 8th 1896); Jackman v. Continental Nat. Bank, i6 F.
(2d) 728 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); Coon v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 96o (D.C.E.D. Ill.
1933).
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were contrary to public policy, as expressed in the Act of June 4, 3879, Section 4:9
incorporated bank receiving savings deposits, or
"It shall not be lawful for any ....
deposits of trust funds, to assume the payment of, or to become liable for, or to guarantee to pay the principal of, or the interest on, any bonds, notes or other evidences of
indebtedness of, for, or on account of any person or persons, company or incorporation;
and in any assumption, liability or guarantee, whereby such deposits or trust funds
could be jeopardized or impaired shall be null and void."
The court felt that the promises to repurchase were included within the language of this statute, regarding the vendor bank as a broker selling securities on
commission for a mortgagor. It appears from the record in related cases,' 0 however, that the bank bought the securities at a discount and sold them at retail,
retaining the profits; such securities as were not sold were placed in the investment portfolio of the bank. It seems somewhat difficult to bring a repurchase
agreement within the exact language of the statute, because no liability is assumed on behalf of a third person; the bank merely contracted, on its own behalf, to provide a ready market for such securities as its customers desired to
sell.
It would seem, however, that the statute does express a strong public policy
against repurchase agreements. The dominant purpose of the statute was to
protect depositors in savings banks by preventing such banks from embarking
on speculative enterprises. A bank's promise to repurchase securities creates a
liability which is contingent on circumstances over which the bank has little,
if any, control. It is a liability which may force a bank to absorb large losses in
the event of a market collapse, and thus result in paying out all of the bank's
liquid assets, to the detriment of the depositors. The result reached by the
court seems just, in view of the fact that the complainant may still sue the
mortgagor, and may foreclose on the mortgaged property. On the other hand
the depositor, who stands to gain nothing from the repurchase transaction (since
the bank has no option to repurchase if the market value of the securities becomes higher than their par value), must rely on the general assets of the bank,
whih should not be jeopardized by the bank's speculation. The Federal Se9Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 38, § 41. The Illinois Constitution (1870), Art. XI, § 5,

provides that acts of the General Assembly creating corporations with banking powers must
be ratified by popular vote, and this section was not submitted to popular vote. The court in
the Knass case did not discuss the constitutionality of the section, however, probably relying
on People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 178 N.E. 133 (1931), where it was held the constitutional provision was inapplicable because this section was a portion of the Criminal Code. On the other
hand, it could be argued the section is not penal in nature, and thus'the fact that it appears in
the Criminal Code is immaterial.
IoFreedman v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 259 Ill. App. 519 (1931); Awotin v. Atlas
.Exchange Nat. Bank, 265 Ill. App. 238 (1932); Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269
Ill. App. 588 (i933); Hoffman v. Sears Community State Bank, 269 Ill. App. 644 (r933); cf.
Madison & Kedzie Trust & Savings Bank v. Dean, 263 Ill. App. 646 (i931).

NOTES
curities Act,- the National Banking Act,'2 and the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation Act 3 exemplify the growing public policy that security selling
should be divorced from the banking business, and the Knass case expresses a
judicial realization of the same policy. Many bankers have also declared that
security selling is not a proper commercial banking function.4
The complainant in the Knass case urged that the sale of the bonds and the
agreement to repurchase constituted a conditional sale and so was not within
the prohibitive legislation, citing Wolf v. National Bank of Illinois.'5 In that
case a vendor bank sought to avoid liability on a repurchase agreement on the
theory that the agreement was void under the Illinois Gambling in Futures
Act.' 6 The court described the transaction as a conditional sale, mainly to prevent the application of the Gambling in Futures Act, which is unpopular and
strictly construed.' 7 Subsequent cases overlooked a number of special facts in
the Wolf case and construed all repurchase agreements as conditional sales.' 8
The court in the Knass case distinguished the Wolf case on its facts, but disregarded the cases subsequently misapplying it, and thus perhaps left the interpretation of repurchase contracts in some doubt. It seems clear, however, that
the agreement in the Knass case was not a conditional sale within the ordinary
meaning of the term; the vendee complainant had exercised complete dominion
over the securities, had sold some of them and hypothecated others, and was
under no obligation to the bank in respect to them.9
THEODORE THAu
1148 Stat. 74 0933), 15 U.S.C.A. Supp.
12

§§

77a-77mm (1933).

48 Stat. 184 (1933), i2 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 24 (1933).

Part of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. i68, 12 U.S.C.A. Supp. § 264 (1933).
Kraschel, State Banking Systems in Agricultural States, Great Lakes Banker (July
1933), 68; Holton, Strengthening Public Confidence in the Banks, Great Lakes Banker (July
1933), i9; Underhill, Real Estate, Pick and Choose, Am. Bankers' Assn. Jour. (Aug. 1933),
22; Weidenhaminmer, Control of New Investments, 171 Annals Am. Acad. (Jan. 1934), 73.
3

14

's 178 Ill. 85, 52 N.E. 896 (1899).

16Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. 0933) , C. 38, § 308.
17 Ubben v. Binnian, 182 Ill. 5o8, 55 N.E. 552 (1899); Loeb v. Stern, 198 Ill. 371, 64 N.E.
1043 (1902); Miller v. Sincere, 273 Ill. 194, 112 N.E. 664 (1916); Stewart v. Dodson, 282 1ll.
192, 118 N.E. 405 (917); 1 A.L.R. 1544 (1919); 2 Williston, Sales (2d ed. X924), § 664.

18Ubben v. Binnian, 182 Ill. 5o8, 55 N.E. 552 (1899); Stewart v. Dodson, 282 Ill. 192, 118

N.E. 405 (1917); Roush v. II. Oil Co., i8o Ill. App. 346 (913); Hills v. Hopp, 210 111.App.
365 (i918); Freedman v. Madison & Kedzie Bank, 259 Ill. App. 519 (1931); Awotin v. Atlas
Exchange Nat. Bank, 265 Ill. App. 238 (1932); Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269
Ill. App. 588 (1933); Hoffman v. Sears Community State Bank, 269 In. App. 644 (1933) cf.
Coon v. Smith, 4 Fed. Supp. 960 (D.C.E.D. Ill. 1933), decided before the Knass case changed
the Illinois rule on repurchase agreements. Several other courts have construed repurchase
agreements as conditional sales: Ophir Cons. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, 143 Fed. 829 (C.C.A.
7th x9o6); Hunt v. Wyman, ioo Mass. 198 (1868); Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., 64
Minn. 307, 67 N.W. 70 (1896).
'9 See Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 2a U.L.A. (1924), § i; i Williston, Sales (2d ed.
1924), §§ 27o-272.
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THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF BLOOD TESTS

A court of last-resort recently, for the first time in American legal history,
passed upon the admissibility in evidence of the results of a blood test designed
to show that the defendant was not the father of a certain child, as ha~d been
charged. The lower court's refusal to admit such evidence was sustained, on the
ground that the defendant had failed to prove that the blood test is sufficiently
accurate to have the requisite probative value for legal evidence.' It is believed
that an examination of the subject in the light of the results of medical research
during the past decade2 will indicate that the court might well have taken a
more liberal attitude,3 and that the reliability of blood tests has been proved to
the extent that they may now be considered valuable aids in the administration
of justice.
Since the opening of the twentieth century, medical research has established
a number of important propositions as to the nature and characteristics of human blood. All human blood may be classified into certain definite groups. The
blood of a particular individual may be attributed to one of these groups on the
basis of its agglutination or coagulation with other types of blood serum. These
blood characteristics are transmitted from generation to generation according
to the Mendelian laws of heredity. Finally, on the basis of these blood groupings, the possibility or impossibility that an individual having blood of a certain
type was born from the union of two other individuals of ascertained types may
be determined.4
Certain conclusions may be drawn from these propositions as to the use of the
blood test in cases of disputed paternity: (i) If a child's blood falls within a
group to which might be attributed the blood of a union of the alleged parent
and the undisputed parent, it is possible, though not certain, that the child is
their offspring; (2) on the other hand, if the child's blood is not such a possible
' State v. Damm, 252 N.W. 7 (S.D. 1933). The court said: "We base such holding specifically upon the proposition that it does not sufficiently appear from the record in this case that
modem medical science'is agreed upon the transmissibility of blood characteristics to such an
extent that it can be accepted as an unquestioned scientific fact that, if the blood groupings of
the parents are known, the blood group of the offspring can be necessarily determined, or that,
if the blood groupings of the mother and child are known, it can be accepted as a positively
established scientific fact that the blood group of the father could not have been a certain
specific characteristic group." (252 N.W. 7, 12).
2 See Lee, Blood Tests for Paternity, 12 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 441 (1926). Mr. Lee offers a
learned discussion of medical theory based upon Ottenberg's work in 1921-22.
3 For some recent liberal developments in the field of evidence, see Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933), in which the wife of a defendant was permitted to testify
on his behalf in a criminal trial; and United States v. Provident Trust Co., 290 U.S. 614, 54
Sup. Ct. 389 (1934), in which evidence of incapacity to have issue wds admitted.
4Ottenberg, Heredity Blood Qualities; Medico-Legal Applications of Human Blood Grouping, 6 Jour. Immunology 363 (1921). His conclusion as to the legal value of such tests is emphatic: "The number of instances in which the group blood test is of value is limited, but within those limits its evidence is exclusive."
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resultant, then it is certain that the person allegedly a parent is not such
in fact.S
These conclusions were accepted at an early date by continental courts, and
numerous cases may be found in which blood tests were utilized to determine
parentage.6 In England and America, however, no reported case has been found
which discloses the use of such a test; 7 in Ireland, two lower courts have, quite
recently, admitted such evidence.8 Until about ten years ago, the reluctance of
the courts to admit evidence of this type was justified in part by the lack of
agreement among medical experts as to the theories involved, although there was
complete uniformity as to the practical results.9 These theoretical difficulties
were ended by Bernstein's discoveries in 1924. In addition, a further set of tests
was developed in 1928 which clarifies and renders more exact the classification
originally developed by Bernstein, and makes it possible in some instances to
determine differences within the categories formerly recognized.'0
5The possibilities are expressed in tabular form as follows [from Bernstein, 23 Klin. Wchn1495 (1924); 37 Ztschr. f. Indukt. Abstram. u. Vererbungs. 237 (1925)]:
Heredity of the Landsteiner Blood Groups (Bernstein)
Groups of Children
Groups of Children
Groups of Parents
Impossible
Possible
A, B, AB
0
I OXO

schr.

B, AB
O,A
A, AB
O, B
B, AB
O, A
none
0, A, B, AB
5. AXB
A, AB
O,B
6. BXB
O, AB
A, B
7. OXAB
0
A, B, AB
8. AXAB
0
A, B, AB
9. BXAB
0
A, B, AB
to. ABXAB
6 See Weiner's articles, 21 Jour. Immunology 157 (1931); 24 Jour. Immunology 443 (i933);
and 186 Am. Jour. Med. Sci. 257 (i933); also, editorial, 85 Jour. Am. Med. Assoc. 612 (193i).
7In
Weiner, Determination of Non-Paternity, i86 Am. Jour. Med. Sci. 257, 264-265
OXA
2.
3. OXB
4. AXA

(933), a number of instances of the use of the blood tests in trial courts is set out. See also
Beuschel v. Manowitz, i U.S.L.W. 4o8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934), in which it was held that the defendant was entitled to an order requiring plaintiff and her child to submit to blood tests.
8 See 66 Ir. L. T. 64, II (1932).Both were lower court cases. In the first, the defendant
was convicted, but secured a new trial when, on appeal, a blood test was held admissible to
show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. In the second, the test appeared unsuccessful.
9 For example, see the controversy between Ottenberg and Buchanan: Ottenberg, 77 Jour.
Am. Med. Assoc. 682 (192); 78 ibid. 873 (1922); 79 ibid. 2137 (1922). Buchanan, 78 ibid. 89
(1922); 79 ibid. i8o (1922). Ottenberg's position was apparently the strongest, in view of the
preponderance of current medical authority supporting his theory. See Weiner, 99 Jour. Am.
Med. Assoc. 242 (1932), who says that the only disagreement was over the theory proposed to
explain the undisputed law.
o Bernstein's work was fairly conclusive, and research since that time has failed to reveal a
single exception to the theory he stated, although such eminent scientists as Schiff, Thomsen,
Snyder, Furuhata, and Vuori have worked on the problem. Weiner has shown that the theory
does not change the law itself, as previously formulated; but that it offers additional opportu-
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Even with this added test, the number of blood groups is small, and the number of people whose blood falls within any one group is large. No claim is made
that blood tests will determine that an individual is the parent of a particular
child; their present value lies in determining, in a well-defined class of instances,
that a particular individual could not be the parent of a particular child. It has
been estimated that the chances of establishing non-paternity by means of the
earlier (Bernstein) tests alone are about one in six; if in addition the new tests
are used, the chances are increased to about one in three.- More than two-thirds
of all cases in New York City in which new-born infants have been accidentally
interchanged in hospitals have thus been solved.1
As legal evidence, the blood test definitely seems to belong in the category of
"expert opinion," since the conclusions are based upon medical research, involving propositions totally unfamiliar to the layman.'3 Where the result of the
test is to show that the person charged with being the child's parent might be
such, the probative value of the evidence is admittedly low, and its prejudicial
effect in a jury trial, particularly in a criminal case, may be high. Thus it may
properly be excluded where its introduction is sought to prove paternity.'4
Where, however, the result shows that the person charged could not be the parent of a child, its value as proof of non-paternity is unquestioned in medical circles; and, it is believed, the same recognition should be accorded to it in courts of
law.'s
WiLLIAm

Louis
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nities for the proof of non-paternity. Weiner, Determination of Non-Paternity, i86 Am. Jour.
Med. Sci.

257 (I933).

The new tests, developed by Landsteiner and Levine, deal with certain additional substances in the blood. See Landsteiner and Levine, 47 Jour. Exp. Med. 757 (1928); 48 ibid. 731
(1928). Experiments in confirmation of the theory, conducted by Schiff, Weiner, Vaisberg,
Thomsen, Clausen, and others, number about 2o,ooo, and no exception has been found. For
example, see Weiner and Vaisberg, 20 Jour. Immunology 371 (1931); Weiner, Rothberg, and
Fox, 23 Jour. Immunology 63 (1932).
11 Weiner, Lederer, and Polayes, 19 Jour. Immunology 259 (i93o); Hooker and Boyd, 16
ibid. 451 (X929).
12 Weiner, supra note 7, 259.
13But see Lee, supranote 2, who argues that blood tests are to be classed as real evidence.
On theuse of other Mendelian traits in evidence, see i Wigmore, Evidence (2d td. 1923), § 165.
14 See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), § 1904.
sIn criminal cases the accused, if he fears that the results of the blood test will be unfavorable and that the court may not exclude the testimony on grounds of prejudice, may
properly refuse to submit to the test since he may thus incriminate himself. Cf. Hinton, Cases
on Evidence (2d ed. i93o), x86-221.

